NOTES OF CASES.

Female Veracity Judicially Vindicated.—That the "gentler" sex is rapidly taking on the "sturdy" quality is shown by a late Missouri decision—Bliss *v.* Bliss. This was a divorce case, in which the husband admitted most of the wife's imputations, but made counter imputations. The wife flatly denied everything to her disadvantage. The husband's attorney, in urging a reversal of the judgment against his client, insisted that the husband's testimony should prevail, on the ground that women as a class are untrustworthy and untruthful. In support of this contention he recited at length from the world's greatest philosophers and poets. But it was of no avail. The worthy court refused to lend legal sanction to the harping of the poets or the speculations of philosophy. The day of equality has dawned.—Case and Comment, No. 37, p. 886.

Savage Animal—Kept in Yard Adjoining Theatre Where Performance Given—Yard No Part of Theatre Premises—Liability of Proprietors of Theatre.—Connor *v.* Princess Theatre. The general rule of law is, that if a person, whether owner or not, harbours a dangerous animal, or allows it to be on and resort to his premises and such animal causes damage to another, the person harbouring the animal is liable to an action for the damages. See McKone *v.* Wood (1831), 5 C. & P. 1; May *v.* Burdett, (1846), 9 Q. B. 101 approved of in Baker *v.* Snell (1908), 2 K. B. at p. 355.

In this case it was sought to attach liability to managers of the theatre, where the owner of the monkey was engaged. The premises adjoining the theatre on which the monkey was when it bit the plaintiff's child was not the premises of the defendant, nor under their control. Neither the defendants nor the performers had a right to use the yard, therefore, the monkey could not be said to be harboured by the defendants, and no liability attached to them.—Canada Law Journal, February, 1913.

Proximate Cause.—One Williams was driving his automobile on the right-hand side of a public way at the rate of about 15 miles an hour. On the other side of the street, going slowly in the opposite direction, was an ice wagon with a single heavy horse attached. A large dog, weighing 135 pounds, ran toward the automobile, barking as he ran. When he reached the automobile he snapped at the right fore tire, but missed it, and his body struck the left fore wheel, which caused the automobile to skid to the other side of the road, so that, while still in contact with the dog, it came directly in front of the horse of the ice wagon, which reared and descended upon the top of the automobile injuring it. The dog did not touch the horse. Defendant in an action for such injuries contended that the jury was not warranted in finding that the dog was the sole, direct and proximate